Beyond Resemblance (Philosophical Review 122:2, 2013)
What is it for a picture to depict a scene? The most orthodox philosophical theory of pictorial representation holds that depiction is grounded in resemblance. A picture represents a scene in virtue of being similar to that scene in certain ways. I present evidence against this claim: curvilinear perspective is one common style of depiction in which successful pictorial representation depends as much on a picture's systematic differences with the scene depicted as on the similarities; it cannot be analyzed in terms of similarity alone. The same problem arises for many other kinds of depiction. I conclude that depiction in general is not grounded in resemblance, but geometrical transformation.
Varieties of Iconicity (with Valeria Giardino, Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 6:1, 2015)
This introductory essay aims to familiarize readers with basic dimensions of variation among pictorial and diagrammatic representations. We highlight two axes of variation: first, variation among the rules which characterize different systems of representation; and second, variation among the use properties associated with different systems. We illustrate these dimensions of difference first for the case of logical diagrams, and second for the case of perspectival drawing.
Conventions of Viewpoint Coherence in Film (with Sam Cumming and Rory Kelly, forthcoming Philosopher's Imprint)
Content and Target in Pictorial Representation (working draft)
This paper argues for a particular model of pictorial representation. The model distinguishes between two fundamental semantic relations: on one hand, a picture expresses a content; on the other, it aims at a target scene. A picture is accurate when the content it expresses fits the target scene it aims at. In addition, content in this model has two aspects: singular content specifies the particular individuals which a picture is of, and attributive content specifies the properties and relations which the picture ascribes to those individuals. For a picture to be accurate, both aspects must be matched in the target. I call this the Three-Part Model because it distinguishes between the triad of attributive content, singular content, and target. Previous work on depiction has recognized a distinction between attributive content and some kind of singular element, but it has failed to separate singular content from target. By contrast, I'll argue from cases that this additional distinction is required, and I'll develop a version of the Three-Part Model that results. Ultimately, I'll suggest that the same basic, three-part architecture is common to language, visual perception, and mental imagery.
Introduction to Philosophy of Mind (Phil 7)
Introduction to Theory of Computation (Phil 133)
Philosophy of Visual Representation (Phil 161)