Beyond Resemblance (Philosophical Review 122:2, 2013)
What is it for a picture to depict a scene? The most orthodox philosophical theory of pictorial representation holds that depiction is grounded in resemblance. A picture represents a scene in virtue of being similar to that scene in certain ways. I present evidence against this claim: curvilinear perspective is one common style of depiction in which successful pictorial representation depends as much on a picture's systematic differences with the scene depicted as on the similarities; it cannot be analyzed in terms of similarity alone. The same problem arises for many other kinds of depiction. I conclude that depiction in general is not grounded in resemblance, but geometrical transformation.
Varieties of Iconicity (with Valeria Giardino, Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 6:1, 2015)
This introductory essay aims to familiarize readers with basic dimensions of variation among pictorial and diagrammatic representations. We highlight two axes of variation: first, variation among the rules which characterize different systems of representation; and second, variation among the use properties associated with different systems. We illustrate these dimensions of difference first for the case of logical diagrams, and second for the case of perspectival drawing.
Counterfactuals as Strict Conditionals (working draft)
This paper presents a new deductive argument for the strict conditional analysis of counterfactual conditionals, as against the dominant variably strict analysis due to Robert Stalnaker (1968) and David Lewis (1973). Counterfactual conditionals belong to a broader linguistic family of counterfactual modals. The argument offered here turns on facts about the logical interaction of counterfactual conditionals and counterfactual possibility modals (like "could" and "might"). I call this the Coordination Argument. The argument not only validates the strict conditional analysis of counterfactual conditionals, it also implies a distinctive account of their semantic relationship to counterfactual modality generally. I call this the Coordinated Analysis. This view in turn sheds light on the division of communicative labor between semantics and pragmatics in counterfactual discourse.
Introduction to Philosophy of Mind (Phil 7)
Introduction to Theory of Computation (Phil 133)
Philosophy of Visual Representation (Phil 161)